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I. INTRODUCTION
Famously one of two Constitutional concepts that justifies its own existence,
the patent system is built into the very fabric of our national charter.' The
Constitution embraces the concept of intellectual property in order "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" and provides for its
protection "by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 2 While the
Founding Fathers are to be praised for their economy of language, over two
centuries of development-philosophical, linguistic, technological-have called
into question both the meaning and the grounds of this exhortation.
In the past decade, a momentous new development in patent practice has
appeared: legal method patents. As an offshoot of business method patents,
legal methods were previously not considered to be patentable subject matter.
However, the landmark decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc. firmly rejected the business method patent exemption, thus
opening the door for a new breed of intellectual property.3 In some sense this
development should not be surprising, and could be seen as a predictable
accretion to previously patentable subject matter and a natural result of our
transformation into a service-oriented economy. Legal method patents, by that
account, are "evolutionary rather than revolutionary." 4 While that may be true,
the rapidity of that evolution, coupled with a sense of the idiosyncrasy of legal
methods, has provoked no small amount of consternation in the commentariat.
And so legal method patents have been attacked from all sides. Detractors
contend that such patents are not "inventions" for purposes of statutory
inclusion,5 that their issuance is fundamentally at odds with tax policy, 6 that the
incentive-based rationale for patents is not implicated in the development of
legal methods,7 and that the existence of such patents may inhibit an
1 U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8, cl. 8. The other, of course, is the Second Amendment's rationale for
the right to bear arms.
2 Id.
3 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cit. 1998).
4 Richard S. Gruner, When Worlds Collide: Tax Planning Method Patents Meet Tax Practice, Making
Attorneys the Latest Patent Infringers, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 33, 34.
5 Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot Be
Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333 (2007).
6 Linda M. Beale, Tax Patents: At the Crossroads of Tax and Patent Law, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 107.
7 Ellen P. Aprill, Responding to Tax Strategy Patents (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-
26), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980347.
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individual's right of access to the law.8 Those affected by this subject matter
expansion, at this point primarily tax practitioners, are strongly opposed.9
Critics of the current regime include the American Institute of CPAs,' 0 the
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel," both Barack Obamal 2 and
Bobby Jindal,13 the American Bar Association Section of Taxation,14 and a
legion of law professors and attorneys.
It is neither within the scope of this Note nor the realm of the author's
ability to fully contend with the depth and breadth of the arguments presented
by such a coalition. However, this Note does intend to consider at length one
particular contention utilized by the opponents of legal method patents.
Sometimes addressed directly, but quite often lingering in the corners of a thesis
is the suggestion that the issuance of legal method patents heralds grave
consequences for the rights of the public, particularly their right of access to the
law and due process.15 The presumption is that a taxpayer (or a criminal, or a
businessman) might be prohibited from exercising his legal rights as a result of
another entity's monopoly over a particular legal mechanism. While this
argument potentially has merit in some distinctive circumstances (especially, say,
in the context of a criminal trial), within the framework of the current patent
regime there is no reason to believe that granting monopolies over legal
methods will, as a rule, negatively affect people's rights-constitutional, natural,
or otherwise.
This Note contends that legal method patents are not inherently violative of
due process or other guaranteed rights. This Note will discuss legal principles
that underscore this conclusion, but the focus will be on arguments deriving
from policy considerations. Part II will establish the background in which the
problem arises by examining case law that opened up the possibility of legal
method patents. It will provide an overview of the current state of such
8 Robert King, Comment, Only in America Tax Patents and the New Sale of Indulgences, 60 TAX
LAw. 761 (2007).
9 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 348.
10 Letter from The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel et al. to John Conyers, Jr. et
al. (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.actec.org/public/Governmental_Relations/BelcherCo
mmentsl0_21_09.asp.
11 Id.
12 Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. (2007).
13 To amend tide 35, United States Code, to limit damages and other remedies with respect to
patents for tax planning methods, H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
14 Letter from Stanley L. Blend, ABA Section of Taxation Chair, to Douglas H. Shulman, IRS
Commissioner (July 7, 2008), available at https://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/commentsonpropo
sedregsundersecs70 1and61 11 .pdf.
15 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 371; Beale, supra note 6, at 147.
[Vol. 18:595598
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patents, and discuss some legislative and administrative activity that has resulted
from their arrival. Arguments against the existence of legal method patents,
along with their respective legal and philosophical underpinnings, will be
presented in Part II.
Part III of this Note will briefly address some of the popular arguments
against legal method patents, in order to give rise to at least the possibility of
validity in the face of non-rights-oriented criticism. Part III will also more fully
respond to the arguments arising from due process and rights-based concerns,
first through the lens of legal reasoning and interpretation, and then by
examining the underlying policy considerations in determining the desirability
of legal method patents. Part IV will summarize the status quo and argue that
allowing legal method patents will not necessarily deprive the citizenry of
essential rights. Moreover, the section will contend that legal methods stand to
receive the same benefits as other areas of human activity from their inclusion
in the patent regime.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE STATE STREET DECISION AND THE EMERGENCE OF BUSINESS
METHOD PATENTS
In 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided State
Street, effectively preempting decades of jurisprudence regarding what is and is
not (and, concomitantly, what should and should not be) patentable.16 The case
arose as a result of a patent assigned to Signature Financial Group, Inc.
(Signature) that taught a system for aggregating the assets of various mutual
funds into a central pool, thereby allowing more efficient investment of
capital.'7 State Street Bank & Trust Co. (State Street) attempted to negotiate
with Signature to acquire a license to the patented system.' 8 When these
negotiations broke down, State Street brought a declaratory judgment action,
seeking to have the patent invalidated on grounds of "invalidity,
unenforceability, and noninfringement." 9
Upon review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took issue
with essentially all of the holdings of the lower court.20 First, it rejected the
district court's interpretation of the Signature patent as constituting a method,
16 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
17 Id. at 1370.
1s Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. paSSIM.
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elucidating " 'machine' claims having 'means' clauses may only be reasonably
viewed as process claims if there is no supporting structure in the written
description that corresponds to the claimed 'means' elements." 21 Signature's
patent specifically sets forth a variety of "means," including a computer
processor, storage capacity, and specifically configured logic circuits. 22
Next, the court rejected the classification of the Signature patent's subject
matter as non-statutory.23  The federal circuit rejected the "mathematical
algorithm/physical transformation" test used by the district court, claiming the
"test has little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory
subject matter." 24 In the first place, the court held that the analysis should not
hinge on the presence of a mathematical algorithm, which is, at some level,
present in "every step-by-step process, be it electronic or chemical or
mechanical." 25 The court declined to directly address the second, "physical
transformation" element of the test, simply stating that courts contemplating a
claim should not focus on the claim's subject matter categorization, "but rather
on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical
utility." 26
Finally, and most importantly here, the court put to rest the "ill-conceived"
business method exception that comprised the lower court's alternative proof
of invalidity. 27 The appellate court held that the introduction of Section 103 in
the 1952 Patent Act rendered business methods subject to an evaluation for
validity commensurate with other processes and methods. 28 The cases the
lower court cited in direct support of the proposition were rendered moot by
the 1952 Act.29 In that sense, the expansion of patentable subject matter to
include business methods was indeed "evolutionary"-that is, brought about
through considered legislative action-and the Federal Circuit's In re Bi/ski
decision is more an overdue clarification of the operative principle than a
landmark break with prior jurisprudence. However, the abundance of post-
1952 cases that assumed the continued soundness of the business method
exception seems to emphasize the unexpectedness of the "new"
21 Id. at 1371.
22 Id at 1371-72 (discussing U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991)).
23 Id. at 1372.
24 Id. at 1374.
25 Id. (quoting In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370,1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
26 Id. at 1375.
27 Id
28 Id
29 Id
600 [Vol. 18:595
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interpretation, 30 and this clarification did indeed usher in a new line of thought
on patentable subject matter.31
B. EXTENDING THE DOCTRINE: LEGAL METHOD PATENTS
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), as bureaucratic
agencies are wont to do, responded positively to this extension of their powers.
Following State Street, the USPTO began freely issuing previously unimaginable
patents, such as the nigh-infamous "1-click" checkout method patented by
Amazon. 32 Then, in 2003, the USPTO unilaterally expanded the scope of
business method patents and issued the first-ever legal method patent.33 The
patented invention was designed to "provide a means by which a holder of
nonqualified stock options may transfer the value of the options to family
members with minimum transfer tax liability." 34 The end result is the creation
of a Stock Option Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (SOGRAT). 35 State Street
did not address the validity-or lack thereof-of legal method patents, but its
blanket acceptance of business method patents in general (provided, of course,
they met the standard requirements for patent validity), paved the way for the
inclusion of legal methods.36 Here again, one can discern a natural, predictable
evolution, an expansion, of the scope of patentable subject matter.3 7 Once
again, as in the case with business method patents, this was not a gradual
process, but quite sudden. The rapidity of these significant shifts in patent
policy, however predictable or natural, caught many off guard, and a pushback
of sorts began.
C. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
Just over a year after State Street was decided, Congress passed legislation
providing new rights to those accused of infringing the newly allowed business
30 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D. Mass.
1996).
31 Patentable subject matter, at its most basic, encompasses "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof. . .. " 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
32 U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
33 U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) (issued May 20, 2003) ['790 Patent].
34 Id.
35 Id. The term "SOGRAT" is also a trademark of the assignee.
36 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
37 Gruner, supra note 4.
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method patents.38 The law provides parties using the patented business method
prior to the patent's issuance a complete defense against charges of
infringement.30 The expansion of the patent regime was no longer going
unchecked.
Following the issuance of legal method patents by the USPTO, a similar
backlash began, although to less significant results. On February 17, 2007, a bill
was introduced to limit access to tax shelters and contained, as one of its
provisions, a ban on patenting tax shelters.40 On May 17, 2007, a bill very
similar to 35 U.S.C. § 273 was introduced, seeking to limit liability for those
infringing on patents for tax strategies. 41 Most recently, in March of 2009,
matching bills were presented in each house of Congress that closely resembled
the proposed the "Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act" presented in February 2007.42
All of these bills have enjoyed some measure of support in the legislative
process, though none have been passed into law.
The Internal Revenue Service has also sought to provide some sort of
framework for managing these new patents. In 2007, the IRS proposed
requiring disclosure of the use of patented tax strategies.43 Enhanced oversight
capabilities such as these may do more than grant government agencies a
window into the patents' usage: they could create a chilling effect through the
specter of an audit.44 The regulations proposed by the IRS, like the legal
method-specific bills presented in Congress, have not yet achieved any success,
and the fate of legal method patents has largely been left in the hands of the
courts.
D. AFFIRMATION: THE BILSK DECISION
Those hoping for the judiciary to roll back patent subject matter expansion
were sorely disappointed when the Supreme Court decided Bi/ski in the summer
of 2010.45 The case centers on the denial of a patent teaching a method of
38 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2010).
39 Id. § 273(b)(1).
4 Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. (2007).
41 To amend title 35, United States Code, to limit damages and other remedies with respect to
patents for tax planning methods, H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007).
42 Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 1265, 111th Cong. (2009); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S.
506, 111th Cong. (2009).
43 72 Fed. Reg. 54,615 (Sept. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 30).
44 Lisa Lambert, Trend of "Owning" Tax Avoidance Methods Grows in U.S., REuTERS, Nov. 15,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1526035520071115?sp=true.
45 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
[Vol. 18:595602
8
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/12
2011] LEGAL METHOD PATENTABILITYAND PUBLIC RIGHTS 603
hedging the risk of price volatility.46 Specifically, the patent's claims refer to
hedging risk in energy commodities, although the techniques used therein could
theoretically apply to virtually any sufficiently sophisticated market.47
1. Rejection of the 'Machine-or-Transformation" Test. In denying the validity of
the patent, the Federal Circuit rejected the "useful, concrete and tangible result"
analysis it relied on in State Street, and instead relied on the "machine-or-
transformation" test, laid out by the Supreme Court in Benson.48 The Supreme
Court rejected this test as the sole determinant for process patent eligibility.49
The Court frowned upon the restrictive interpretation of the machine-or-
transformation test, repeating their admonition that courts "should not read
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed."50 Further, the Court reminded us that, under basic tenets of
statutory construction, words are to be interpreted as possessing their
"ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."5  The term "process" is
explicitly defined in the Patent Act as a "process, art or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material." 52 Therefore, the Court determined, there is no reason to require a
proposed patent's compliance with the machine-or-transformation test in order
to be correctly categorized as a "process." 53 The machine-or-transformation
test is "a useful and important clue, an investigative tool . . . not the sole test for
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process.' "54
2. An Expansive and Inclusive View of the Patent Regime. Justice Kennedy,
writing here without the backing of a majority, went on to elucidate the policy
advantages secured by an expansive interpretation of process patent validity.
The Industrial Age has passed; a sizable portion of today's innovations are not
physical or tangible, and represent such diverse and important endeavors such
as "software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based
on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital
signals."55 Amicus briefs cited by Justice Kennedy stressed the research and
development costs required to fund advancements in their respective industries,
46 Id. at 3223-24.
47 Id. at 3231.
48 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 450 U.S. 175
(1981)).
49 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010).
50 Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
51 Id
52 35 U.S.C. S 100(b) (2010).
5 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
54 Id. at 3227.
s Id.
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thus implicating the necessity of securing limited monopoly rights in order to
reward and encourage innovation.5 6
Justice Kennedy declined to comment on the suitability of these particular
enumerated fields for patent protection. 57 Indeed, he even acknowledged the
forthcoming difficulties as our patent system is in effect expanded to
encompass esoteric and unforeseen modes of development.58 However, such
quandaries are not to be seen as a reason to limit prima facie the breadth of
patent protection. The heart of the Patent Act, Section 101, is to be viewed as a
"dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions."59
The cutting edge of patentable subject matter, as a rule, borders greenfields. "A
categorical rule denying patent protection for 'inventions in areas not
contemplated by Congress .. . would frustrate the purposes of the patent
law.' "60 It is worth stressing that this interpretation is not an expansion of
patentable subject matter to all far-flung, unanticipated dominions. Rather, it is
a charge to draw the metes and bounds of validity through reference to the
limitations laid out in the Patent Act, and not "to impose other limitations that
are inconsistent with the text and the statute's purpose and design." 61
3. Treatment of Business Method Patents. The Court specifically addresses and
affirms the validity of business method patents, basing its reasoning on grounds
similar to the expansive view of process patent validity discussed above. The
Court has already established that "categories of inventions or discoveries that
are eligible for protection" are to be afforded the full scope allowed to them by
the Patent Act.62 Business method patents are therefore incorporated within
the Act since "[t]he Court is unaware of any argument that the 'ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning' of 'method' excludes business methods." 63
Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. § 273, limiting liability for some business method
patent infringers, represents a clear acknowledgement and acceptance of the
existence of business method patents by Congress. 64 State Street held that the
56 See Brief for The Business Software Alliance as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 5-
8, Bilski v. Doll, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964); Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology
Industry Organization et al. in Support of Neither Party at 10-13, Bilski v. Doll, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010) (No. 08-964).
57 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
ss Id.
59 Id. at 3227 (quoting J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135
(2001)).
60 Id (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)).
61 Id. at 3226.
62 Id. at 3225.
63 Id. at 3228 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
64 Id. at 3228-29.
604 [Vol. 18:595
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business method exception to patentable subject matter was a false doctrine
following the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.65 To hold business method
patents not patentable as a rule "would violate the canon against interpreting
any statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision
superfluous." 66 Business methods are therefore granted legitimacy by both the
legislative and judicial branches.
The Court also discusses the growing relevance of business method patents
in the Information Age.67 Just as with software and medical techniques,
business methods' asomatous nature begets special problems, and, indeed,
entire subcategories of the field may represent invalid subject matter. 68
However, "the Patent Act leaves open the possibility that there are at least some
processes that can be fairly described as business methods that are within
patentable subject matter under § 101."69
4. Bilski's Legacy. The patent at issue in Bilski, as it turns out, does not fall
within this conceptual zone of validity. The Court decided the case on narrow
grounds, rejecting the petitioners' claims on the basis that they attempted to
patent abstract ideas, namely the hedging of risk.70 Bilski will provide some
guidance as to what constitutes an acceptable marshalling of abstract ideas into
a patentable process, but its primary impact will likely be the resounding
affirmation of business method patent validity based on a fairly expansive view
of patentable subject matter.
However, though the Court unanimously agreed upon the merits of the
case, the validity of business method patents as a rule merely earned the
accordance of a narrow majority of five. And some of the most exuberant
language regarding the expansive scope of subject matter validity7' failed to
acquire a majority opinion at all.72 justice Stevens's concurrence takes direct
issue with these sections.73 But Justice Scalia, whose abstention from these
sections denied them majority status, declines to establish which aspect (or
aspects) of them he finds disagreeable. It is worth noting that Justice Scalia, at
oral argument "closely questioned the patentee's lawyer on the history of
65 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
66 Bi/ski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (citing Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009)).
67 Id. at 3227.
68 Id. at 3227-28.
69 Id. at 3229.
70 Id. at 3229-30.
71 Part II-B-2 and II-C-2, tracing innovation's are through history.
72 Id. at 3227-30.
73 Id. at 3231-57 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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business method patents," 74 the focus of the sections with which he declined to
jon.
It is of particular importance to this Note that the Supreme Court's decision
in Bilski refrains entirely from discussing patents on legal methods. The lower
court acknowledges their existence, but only in combination with other
intangibles, such as "organizational relationships," "business risks," and
"arbitration methods."7 5 There are certainly differences between the specific
(legal method patents) and the general (business method patents). These are
differences the Court would have been strained to address within the context of
Bilski. However, by declining to discuss or articulate the distinctiveness of legal
method patents, the Court leaves open at least the possibility of their validity
within the confines of the Bilski decision. This Note will proceed from a
presumption of this validity, and address concerns specific to legal method
patents in order to more fully justify their existence.76
E. THE STATUS QUO: TAX STRATEGY PATENTS AND THEIR CRITICS
Since the initial SOGRAT patent was granted in 2003, patents on legal
methods have become quite favored, with 117 issued and 151 pending as of
September 2010.77 The USPTO has fully embraced the new paradigm, going so
far as to create a specific category for tax strategy patents: U.S. Patent
Classification 705/36T.78 And while no court has had the opportunity to
specifically rule on their validity, at least one lawsuit has been brought seeking
to enforce the assignee's monopoly right.79
So far legal method patents have been granted only to patents that teach a
specific subcategory of such methods: tax strategies. Other legal methods, such
as, say, a novel criminal defense system or a particular corporate structure
74 Tom Goldstein, Business Method Patents Nearly Bite the Dust (Updated), ScoTUS BLOG (July 6,
2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=22782 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument,
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964)).
75 In r Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962, 1010 (Fed. Cit. 2008).
76 This presumption of validity is in keeping with patent law generally, as 35 U.S.C. 5 282
maintains that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid." Legal methods, at this point a fait accompli,
should thereby enjoy this presumption.
77 Letter from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants et al. to Patrick J. Leahy et
al. (Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://www.aicpa.org/Press/DownloadableDocuments/9-28-201
0-Coalition%2OLetter%20to%2OBan%2OTax%20Strategy/o20Patents.pdf.
78 U.S. Patent Classification 705/36T, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classificati
on/numeric/class705_sub36t.jsp (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
79 Wealth Transfer Group v. Rowe, No. 3:06CV00024 (D. Conn. filed January 6, 2006). The
suit sprang from none other than the very first legal method patent issued. The suit was
eventually settled "based on a presumption of validity." See Beale, supra note 6, at 110.
[Vol. 18:595606
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scheme, have not been permitted by the Patent Office. For this reason, this
Note will accord special importance to the issues surrounding tax strategy
patents specifically. Also, in both theory and effect, there are many important
differences between the patents covering tax strategies and patents covering
other especial legal methods, such as those concerning criminal defense. These
differences will be introduced and analyzed along with the various policy
implications arising therefrom.
1. Are Legal Methods 'Inventions"? As previously mentioned, most critics of
legal method patents have acknowledged the authority of the Patent Office to
award them, and instead direct their attacks toward the resultant policy
implications.80 Andrew Schwartz, an attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, takes a more direct approach, suggesting "the Patent Office has acted
beyond the scope of its power by granting legal method patents."8' Schwartz
adduces many of the common arguments against such patents, but his central
thesis is that legal method patents are not "inventions" per Section 101 of the
Patent Act. 2 Because "the Supreme Court has consistently construed the term
'invention' to mean something that utilizes or harnesses laws of nature for
human benefit," legal methods, which utilize the "laws of man," are not
covered under the patent regime.83 Schwartz also denies the title of "patentable
invention" to legal methods on policy grounds, primarily on the grounds that
they do not incentivize development and that they cannot be kept secret.84
2. Are Tax Strategy Patents Inconsistent nth Tax Polig? Linda M. Beale,
Professor of Law at Wayne State University, takes a different tack, arguing that
the granting of legal method patents in the form of tax strategy patents is
inconsistent with the goals of our taxation system.85 Should the Patent Office
continue to grant these effective monopolies, it will "become an enabler of
promoters of tax shelters," a phenomenon whose impact the Internal Revenue
Service is trying to limit.86  Even if the patents do not directly teach
controversial or questionable methods of tax avoidance, Beale's vision of the
tax code as "a system of laws that fairly demand sacrifice of the nation's
residents to fund important governmental goals" casts exclusive rights to avoid
or minimize these sacrifices in a negative light.87 Essentially, the goals of the
8 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 335.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 366.
83 Id. at 336, 366.
,4 Id. at 336, 368-71.
85 Beale, supra note 6.
86 Id. at 130.
87 Id. at 131.
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IRS-to raise funds for the effectuation of governance-will be counteracted
by the granting of exclusive licenses to minimize contribution. Beale also
addresses what she sees as the risk of establishing private monopolies on tax
law interpretation, an issue closer to the focus of this Note, and addressed
directly in Part III.C.3.99
Robert King, writing in the American Bar Association's The Tax Lanyer,
presents a different argument: the vagaries of tax law make it wholly unsuitable
for a happy marriage with patent law.89 A core rationale for granting patent
rights is to secure the usefulness of the invention to the public after the
patentee's period of exclusive right.90 King points out that "tax laws change
very rapidly," and that "[a]fter a 20-year period, it is possible that most, if not
all, of the patented inventions will be impracticable." 91 King contrasts this to
the majority of other patentable inventions, which merely become "obsolete,"
and may still "achieve the purpose for which [they were] designed." 92
3. IncentiviZation of Legal Method Development. Other arguments more directly
address the concern that incentivization is improperly achieved by granting
patents in the legal field. As discussed in the Introduction, our patent system
has been, since its very inception, engineered to provide incentives for the
development of ideas. Monopolies, which patents effectively provide, by
definition create distortions in the marketplace. Even beyond the economic
implications, there are valid concerns over the legitimacy of the government
providing individuals with an exclusive right over an invention. The idea is to
"[draw] a line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."93 Accordingly
the law maintains that these ideas must be "useful." 94 The granting of a limited
monopoly on inventions' uses allows for profit (or at least the possibility
thereof) by forward-thinking inventors, who have ostensibly sacrificed time and
capital in their development.
Starting from the premise that "[t]he benefit of our patent system ... is the
encouragement of innovation," Ellen P. Aprill, John E. Anderson Professor of
Tax Law at Loyola Law School, argues incentives to develop novel tax strategy
88 Id. at 134, 135.
89 King, supra note 8, at 777.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id
93 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.
edu/founders/documents/al_8_8s12.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
94 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Thomas Jefferson authored the Act's original
predecessor, the Patent Act of 1792, which includes the same requirement that an idea be
"useful."
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techniques are not created by their inclusion in the patent regime.95
"Developing tax strategies," Aprill observes, "does not involve the building of
plants or elaborate scientific testing or other capital costs for which monopoly
protection is required to prompt necessary investment."9 6
Beale provides another angle to the incentivization critique (one also
covered by Aprill), claiming "tax advisers already have ample incentive to
innovate."97 Because the business of tax planning is competitive, more or less
efficient, and well-rewarded, there is little reason to grant monopolies to
encourage the development of specific practices or maneuvers.98
4. Other Concerns of Tax Practitioners. Several other arguments are plied
against this expansion of patentable subject matter, with varying degrees of
frequency and passion. Beale questions the ability of the Patent Office's current
staff to adjudge issues relating to tax strategy, and claims they "will not be able
to hire ... sufficient tax attorneys with the breadth and depth of expertise
necessary to assess sophisticated tax planning techniques."99 Beale also raises
the possibility of a world where a select few tax firms have captured a majority
of the relevant outstanding patents and come to an agreement that would
require anyone wishing to practice tax law to deal with their syndicate. 0 0
Finally, opponents are quick to cite the burden that ensuring patent compliance
would place on tax practitioners.101
F. LEGAL METHOD PATENTS AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC
1. What Makes these Concerns Different? With the likely exception of Schwartz,
the criticisms heretofore discussed largely attack legal method patents from the
same perspective as they would were the expansion to cover any sundry area
novel to the patent laws. The extension of intellectual property protection to
any field could be held contrary to the field's countervailing policies, or not
properly incentivizing, or unduly complex. These arguments do not necessarily
hold that there is something fundamentally different about legal method
patents; rather, they are simply not in line with the general principles and
priorities associated with intellectual property law.
9s Aprill, supra note 7, at 5.
96 Id.
97 Beale, supra note 6, at 144.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 131.
10 Id. at 138.
101 See AICPA Letter to Leahy, supra note 77; Beale, supra note 6, at 143; Schwartz, supra note 5,
at 335.
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However, it is quite simple to make the case that legal method patents
represent a subject matter wholly different from the areas traditionally covered
by intellectual property law. This difference may in fact be indicated by legal
method patents' critics' contradictory approaches to their undesirability. The
patents are argued to represent both a threat to the nation's tax base and a
potential windfall to the IRS.102 Tax strategy development is held to be both
nonconducive to incentivization and also already sufficiently incentivized.103
Though these critics cannot agree as to whether the porridge is too hot or too
cold, they all come to the conclusion that it is inedible. It is reasonable to
conclude that this inedibility might stem from the very distastefulness associated
with granting monopoly rights over aspects of public governance, an argument
stemming from the fundamental difference between the respective subject
matters.
This argument is so effective because it draws from a deeply held sense that
laws operate on a fundamentally different premise than other competing
interests that intellectual property concerns. In Schwartz' case, the primary
distinctions between law and ordinarily patentable subject matter (including
even amorphous processes) is that the law by definition does not provide a
meaningful framework on which monopoly rights can reside.104 Taking this
argument a bit further, as Schwartz hints at, one could reach the conclusion that
monopoly rights over legal mechanisms are inappropriate per se, as the public
at large has an inherent right in these same mechanisms.105 Because of the
singular nature of the sovereign, granting exclusive methods of cooperating
with its mandates necessarily invites a different analysis than when considering
interactions arising solely between private parties. Cordoning off formerly legal
avenues of compliance implicates policy concerns distinct from those created
by patents granting dominion over a better mousetrap.
For the purposes of this Note, the distinction between legal method patents
and patents covering any other subject matter can be conceptualized along two
different axes. The first, the "breadth," refers to the unusually large ambit of
legal methods, and particularly tax strategies. The second axis is the "depth,"
that is, the peculiarly personal effect of restricting one's ability to and in
accordance with the law. The latter of these measures serves as the main focus
of the Note, as fundamental rights and due process concerns arise from the fact
102 Compare King, supra note 8, at 773, with April, supra note 7, at 7.
103 Compare Aprill, supra note 7, at 5, with Beale, supra note 6, at 144.
104 Schwartz, supra note 5.
105 Id. at 371.
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that legal method patents affect interests intrinsic to citizenship and
personhood.
2. The Breadth of Tax Strate!g Patents. King posits that "[t]ax patents are
unique in that they potentially affect a much larger population than most other
patents."10 6  Whereas most patents only limit the potential actions of
competitors in the same field, a patent on a tax plan, or, for that matter, a
courtroom maneuver, potentially limits the actions of the entire population.
King bases the need for a deeper "inquiry into the policy considerations of
allowing" tax patents on their "potentially disruptive nature [stemming from]
such far reaching implications." 07
3. The Depth of Tax Strateg (and Legal Method) Patents. Aside from the
possible uniqueness of the breadth of tax strategy (and other legal method)
patents, another, more ominous concern presents itself: their depth. As King
puts it, "patenting methods of complying with the tax law raises the issue of
whether it is normatively preferable for the government to freely license
individuals to prohibit other individuals' access to the tax law." 08 King looks to
Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc.,1o0 a Fifth Circuit decision
in which "free access to the laws [represents] a policy 'based on the concept of
due process.' "110 In Veeck, the court "held that the law of municipalities was
not copyrightable, so that copying of codes did not constitute infringement.""'
King takes care to deny any distinction between the access to the law (the issue
in Veeck) and compliance with the law (more to the point here): "The freedom
of access to the laws that was protected in Veeck, and expressed in the line of
Supreme Court cases that Veeck depended upon, is utterly meaningless without
the concomitant right of an individual to follow those laws."112
In addition, King advances another argument for why it may violate
taxpayers' rights to be constrained by private monopolies on particular methods
of compliance. King quotes Judge Learned Hand: "[a]ny one may so arrange
his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose
the pattern which will best pay the Treasury .. ."113 From this King adduces
that "the government is wholly without the power to determine the amount of
taxes that an individual must pay beyond requiring a compliance with those tax
106 King, supra note 8, at 773.
107 Id. at 773-74.
108 Id. at 775.
109 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
110 Id. at 799.
M1 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 776 (quoting Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934)).
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rules that the government has already promulgated."1 4 Since the government
has no such power, it is not allowed to grant that power to private monopoly
holders, and any attempt to do so is violative of the rights of the public.
III. ANALYSIS
A. NON-RIGHTS-BASED CONCERNS ABOUT LEGAL METHOD PATENTS
The focus of this Note is to demonstrate that legal method patents are not
inherently violative of due process. However, it is worth addressing some of
the most common concerns regarding legal method patents if only to establish
at least the possibility that they are otherwise acceptable.
1. Legal Methods as 'qnvenions." Schwartz's argument, that legal methods are
not properly characterized as "inventions," is perhaps the most compelling.
Further, it holds by far the most danger for legal method patentability as it
attacks not the wisdom or desirability of the policy, but its actual legality.
However, Schwartz does leave a few open questions as to why legal method
patents are inherently not inventions.
Schwartz freely acknowledges that "something that utilizes or harnesses
[the] laws of nature for human benefit qualifies as an 'invention' within the
meaning of the Patent Act."" 5 He gives as an example a business method
employing the Black-Scholes options-pricing model.116 The SOGRAT method
"minimizes transfer tax through the use of grantor-retained annuity
trust ... funded with stock options. . . ."11 7  It is clear from this brief
description that some mathematical algorithm must be employed in order to
harness its functionality. So why should this particular type of business method
receive less protection from the Patent Office?
Schwartz's answer is that, while the SOGRAT or any other method of tax
patent (or, for that matter, any type of legal method patent) may harness laws of
nature in order to provide utility, that utility only exists within the context of
man-made laws. So while the proverbial better mousetrap could still
presumably provide utility in an anarchic state, a method for complying with the
tax code is only useful given the existence of and reliance upon a very specific
114 Id. King considers the payment of license fees to tax strategy patent holders to be effectively
equivalent to paying a higher tax rate.
Is Schwartz, supra note 5, at 372.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 346-47.
[Vol. 18:595612
18
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/12
20111 LEGAL METHOD PATENTABILITYAND PUBLIC RIGHTS 613
law.' 8 It is possible to think of several patented items whose use lies chiefly
within the boundaries of legal compliance: breathalyzers, house arrest bracelets,
etc. However, with these examples there are at least conceptual uses that do
not rely on a legal system to establish their usefulness.
Schwartz' approach, though compelling, may be rendered ineffectual after
the expansive scope afforded to patentable subject matter in Bilski. The Court
there recognized that " 'Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws
would be given wide scope,'" and emphasized that there are "three specific
exceptions to Section 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.' "119 Specifically addressing the
potential validity of business method patents, the Court stresses the necessity of
interpreting terms using their "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning," and
proclaims the absence of any argument that such an interpretation of "method"
in Section 101 excludes business methods.120 Such inclusive language would
presumably encompass legal method patents, which are, after all, a subset of
business method patents.
The Court goes on to cite the prior user rights granted by 35 U.S.C. 5 273 as
evidence that Congress contemplated and approved of the existence of business
method patents. 121 Though no legislation specific to tax strategy patents has
been passed, the introduction of several bills that contend with their presence is
at least some indication that they are regarded as valid. Schwartz' arguments do
bear merit, but it seems that his interpretation of "invention" as specifically
excluding legal methods may not be one shared by the Supreme Court or
Congress. Moving forward, the other arguments against legal method patents
potentially suffer from even more connate fallacies.
2. Consistency with the Nature of Taxation. The argument that tax strategy
patents are at odds with the purposes and goals of our tax policies is less
holistic, and seems to result more from a particular political-philosophical
viewpoint. Of course, one could look at complex and sophisticated tax
planning strategies as clawing back the government's rightful share of revenue,
as a rejection of taxpayers' duties. Congressman Lloyd Doggett, who
introduced a bill to ban the patenting of tax shelters, perhaps most concisely
sums up this viewpoint, claiming "[o]ur government should not be in the
118 Interestingly, the "poison pill" of Schwartz's article's title could theoretically provide value
outside the framework of governmental regulation, at least insofar as it governs private interests,
duties, and relationships. Of course, its usefulness would certainly be diminished.
119 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 308, 309 (1980)).
120 Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
121 Id. at 3228-29.
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business of patenting new and inventive ways to bilk the Treasury at the
expense of law-abiding taxpayers."1 22 Alternatively, one could see tax planning
and its various methodologies as the reservation of an individual's earned
income through legal methods.123 In that sense, the goal of the IRS is not to
collect as much money as possible, but rather to collect all money to which it is
legally entitled under the limitations set upon it by Congress. Going further,
one could claim that leaving capital in the hands of those who seem to be doing
the most to preserve and utilize it is not on its face bad for society at large. It
may be true that some of the technicalities upon which these strategies operate
are unfair to the public, or unwise in their effect on revenue collection. In that
case, there is no reason that the oversight, mistake, or loophole cannot be
eliminated through the usual channels, leaving the owner of a patent teaching
such a method a worthless right. Ruling out entire fields of patent law because
they may unfairly capitalize on an unwise construction of other fields of law
seems unnecessary. In any case, the channeling of novel, valuable, and
unforeseen applications of the tax code through a particular conduit (namely,
the Patent Office) would seemingly provide a much greater vantage point from
which to spot objectionable tax strategies.
Furthermore, it is unclear why granting monopolies on the use of particular
tax strategies would further depress the tax base. Any subsequently discovered
ways to reduce tax liability could be locked up by patent, raising entry costs to
potentially interested taxpayers and perhaps denying them the use of these
strategies altogether. King, no fan of legal method patents, acknowledges this
likelihood.124
In addition to the increased barriers to entry to potential tax strategists, King
introduces the concept of a "patent thicket," which could conceivably emerge
in the tax strategy market.125 King defines the phenomenon as a "theoretical
problem in which multiple overlapping patents cover the same invention, thus
retarding the pace of innovation by requiring subsequent innovators to obtain
agreements from all the overlapping patent holders in order to move forward
with the subsequent invention."1 26 The concept is the logical progression of the
simpler argument above, the difference being that barriers to entry are not
merely dissuasive but prohibitive (not in the sense that paying one's taxes would
become impossible, but in the sense that entire avenues of tax compliance
would be foreclosed). Regardless of the boundaries of the theory reached, King
122 Lambert, supra note 44.
123 This viewpoint is elucidated by Judge Learned Hand in Part II.F.3.
124 King, supra note 8, at 772-73.
125 Id. at 772.
126 Id. at 772 n.74.
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concludes that tax revenue is unlikely to see a significant drop-off as a result of
the allowance of tax strategy patents.127 On the pragmatic level, King compares
Aprill's testimony before Congress in the run-up to the proposed Patent
Reform Act of 2007 to that of the Internal Revenue Service. In contrast to
Aprill, "the Service made no effort to assert that patenting tax strategies could
lead to [a possible drop in the Service's revenue-collecting capabilities]. "128
Indeed, King asserts that in the event of a patent thicket developing in certain
corners of the tax code, "the Service would most likely be able to collect even
more revenue than it currently does." 129
King's argument that the rapidly-changing nature of tax law creates a valid
distinction between legal method patents and those that develop their utility
through the harnessing of natural laws is similarly unavailing. To an extent, this
concern echoes those of Schwartz, who sees man-made law as an improper
grounding for patentable inventions.130 However, King's approach focuses not
on the legal validity of the bargain struck between the government and the
patentee, but on the likely outcome of the bargain.131 Even if we take King's
assertion that the patents at their expiration will be largely worthless, the
argument focuses unduly on semantic distinctions between the outcomes of the
compared subject matters. Whether the invention becomes "obsolete" or
"impracticable," the end result is the lack of any value reaped by the public
from the publication of the patent's specifications.
Moreover, this argument ignores practical aspects of patent practice, namely
the famous admonition that only a small fraction of inventions are capable of
covering the cost of the patent.132 Unprofitable from their inception, it is hard
to see what value the public receives from protecting these patentees' monopoly
rights in return for the invention's schematics. And in contrast with a garage
tinkerer's quest for a vanity patent, it is reasonable to assume that a top-notch
accountant or tax lawyer (that is, one actually capable of producing a
nonobvious and useful method of tax compliance) will only spend resources on
patenting a valuable development. That the shelf life of its usefulness may not
extend past the period of its protection does not differentiate it at all from the
127 Id. at 771.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 772.
130 Schwartz, supra note 5.
131 King, supra note 8, at 777.
132 See Andy Gibbs, Developing Profitable Concepts, ENTREPRENEUR, Aug. 7, 2000, available at http://
www.entrepreneur.com/startingabusiness/inventing/productdevelopment/article3l146. html.
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case of the development of a microchip. The inconstancy of tax law and the
steadfastness of Moore's Law result in the same outcome.133
3. Incentivigation Provided by Legal Method Patents. The first point of the
incentivization argument against legal method patents, that their development
requires no substantial capital outlay that must be protected against the threat of
free riders, falls severely short. It is true that the development process of a tax
strategy or other legal method is likely to be less capital intensive than, say,
producing a new pharmaceutical. It remains true, however, that the
opportunity cost of an attorney, at the top of his field and with years of
experience, devoting considerable time and energy to the resolution of a very
particular question of legal theory, is likely to be meaningful. Regardless, this
capital outlay for the purpose of developing certain inventions, while maybe an
underlying rationale, is not at all a requirement of our patent system. On the
contrary, there is a strong history of accidental yet hugely profitable discovery.
"Teflon, nylon, SuperGlue, and mauve" were all the result of "accidental or
unexpected" discovery.134
As for the argument that tax advisers are already adequately incentivized to
create novel and useful strategies, the fact remains that this is a question of
degree. The alternative viewpoint to Beale's is that issuing patents for these
strategies would bring the "level of innovation to a more optimal point."135
Beale acknowledges the existence of this line of thinking, but counters it with
the need to balance incentive optimization with the supposedly special nature
and requirements of the tax regime, as discussed in Part III.A.2.136
4. OtherNon-Rights-BasedArguments. As for the other arguments against legal
method patents mentioned in this Note, there is little reason to look at the
problems they present as specific to legal method patents. Rather, they
represent problems faced by every aspect of the patent regime. It is undoubted
that becoming familiarized with the tax code will be a challenge for the Patent
Office's examiners. But while tax law can be arcane and incredibly complex,
133 Moore's Law refers to Intel co-founder Gordon Moore's famous prediction that the number
of components able to be placed on an integrated circuit would double every year (later changed
to every two years). See Happy Birthday: The Tale of a Frivolous Rule of Thumb, ECoNOMIsT, Mar. 26,
2005, at 65. The prediction has proven remarkably prescient.
134 Sean B. Seymore, Serendryity, 88 N.C. L. REv. 185, 188-89 (2009). Of course, these
discoveries did all occur in a laboratory, indicating a significant initial investment. However, by
that logic, the expenses of setting up a law firm, of attending law school, and all the sundry
expenses that place one in a position to be able to develop legal methods could be included as a
capital outlay.
1s Lucas Osborn, Tax Strategy Patents: Why the Tax Community Should Not Exclude the Patent System,
18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 325, 370 (2008).
136 Beale, supra note 6, at 144.
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the same is true for space travel, neurochemistry, and, as has become clear in
recent years, exotic financial derivatives. The tax bar may indeed feel that their
knowledge is not within the grasp of the Patent Office employee. Rocket
scientists, neurosurgeons, and bond traders-all of whose inventions are
covered by the same office-likely feel the same.
As to the fear of a band of patent holders requiring tribute to effectively
practice tax law, there are several responses to alleviate this concern. Firstly,
such an arrangement is likely to be violative of several laws outside the realm of
taxation and intellectual property. It would represent a high degree of collusion,
and if actually harmful would attract no small amount of attention. Secondly,
the effect on the way taxes are paid by the allowance of legal method patents is
likely to be small. The patents are only issuable upon a non-obvious, useful,
and novel discovery. This is a tall order and such methods are likely to exist at
the fringe of tax law, as will other legal method patents should they come into
existence.
Beale mentions the possibility that revisions in the tax law might inspire a
''race to the Patent Office . . . in an attempt to corner the patent
market ... using the new provision." 137 However, even these developments,
while perhaps useful and by definition novel, still have to be non-obvious.
"Non-obvious" here would be in reference to the viewpoint of a reasonably
skilled tax adviser, not the drafter who memorialized the imprecise and
malleable regulation or statute. Any new "invention" likely to inspire a "race" is
probably fairly obvious.
The contention that allowing patents in the realm of tax planning, thus
creating compliance costs for accountants and tax lawyers, is perhaps the most
easily addressed. While a variety of commentators decry the cost of compliance
to practitioners, seldom, if ever, is there given any reason why this cost would
be borne disproportionately by the tax industry.'38  It is a given that
monopolies, the effective outcome of providing patents, can create deadweight
loss. However, patents are justified on the basis that the benefit of knowledge
spillover outweighs the cost of allowing artificial scarcity, thereby providing a
more efficient allocation of resources in the long term. Absent any explanation
why tax patents provoke excessive or extraordinary costs, this criticism is just as
easily leveled against the patent system as a whole. Judging solely from the tax
practitioners' perspective, it is certainly suboptimal to check registered patents
to see what strategies have been expropriated. However, the proper interest to
137 Id. at 139.
138 See supra note 35.
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take into account when calculating allocative efficiencies generated by patent
issuance is society's as a whole.
These objections to legal method patents are far from comprehensive, but
they are indicative of the breadth of opinion on the subject, and were
represented based on their frequency of use and strength of argument.
Hopefully this Note, while maybe not overpowering any one of them, has at
least opened up enough doubt in these arguments to justify going into further
depth on another, specific objection to the expansion of patentable subject
matter.
B. THE VARIABILITY OF LEGAL METHOD PATENTS
Even within the confines of the category of legal method patents, various
potential applications possess sharp levels of distinction amongst themselves.
For instance, vastly different interests are affected by a patent teaching a
method to reduce tax liability on the one hand, and a patent teaching a method
to suppress damning evidence in a capital murder trial on the other.139 Use of
the former patent marginally reduces tax exposure for what is likely already a
very wealthy beneficiary.140 The latter patent, exercised in a particular
circumstance, could protect interests guaranteed by the Constitution, and
thereby prevent the erroneous execution of a person.
The theoretical possibility of such an extreme scenario, however unlikely,
has tempered the language of this Note. It would be a stretch to say that legal
method patents cannot be violative of due process concerns. Instead, one is
forced to argue that these patents are not necessaiy violative of due process. To
that end, this Note focuses on due process concerns kindled by tax strategy
patents, the less problematic and grim end of the spectrum. Though this Note
concludes that legal method patents, as an entire category, are neither legally
prohibited nor practically undesirable, this is not to say that limitations might
not be beneficial (or even constitutionally mandated) for certain sub-categories
therein. If a line does exist between acceptable and unacceptable legal method
patents, it is blurry; as useful and interesting as a granular approach to the
139 No patent like the latter has been issued, and it is unlikely that one could. This Note
assumes arguendo that such a patent could hurdle the obstacles placed before it by traditional
patent law (novelty, non-obviousness, etc.) in order to provide a fuller discussion of the issues
surrounding rights-based objections to legal method patents.
14 Gruner, supra note 4, at 66 ("[M]ost if not all of the sorts of tax planning methods that have
qualified for patents as yet cover methods that are only helpful to and capable of use by highly
affluent individual taxpayers or corporations .... ).
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separation of these ideas would be, such an exercise is ultimately outside the
scope of this Note.
Much of the consternation behind the emergence of legal method patents
has focused on slippery slope arguments, asserting the easy conceptual leap
from tax strategies to other legal methods. For example, in Congressional
hearings investigating the impact of tax strategy patents, the issue of the
expansion of these rights to cover other legal methods became a primary
concern.141 Congresswoman Stephanie Tubb Jones asked whether lawyers will
start "seeking a patent on legal advice for picking a jury, setting up the insanity
defense, [and] all kinds of other things that go on in the course of a trial?"142
These concerns were waved away by Professor Richard Gruner, the Director of
the Center for Intellectual Property Law and Professor of Law at the John
Marshall Law School in Chicago. Gruner responded that "the techniques used
in the courtroom and legal practice generally are the common techniques."143
Congresswoman Tubb Jones took issue with the factual content of Professor
Gruner's response, but she would have been better served to attack its
underinclusiveness. Even if Gruner is correct that the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements render most courtroom procedures unpatentable,
those elements are not definitively preclusive of any future developments in
practice.
C. RIGHTS-BASED CONCERNS ABOUT LEGAL METHOD PATENTS
1. An Acceptable Breadth. Pointing to the potentially broad impact of legal
strategy ownership perhaps overemphasizes the difference between this and
other areas of intellectual property law. After all, the entire population is
affected by the issuance of any patent, regardless of the exact field to which it
applies. Patents are essentially a bargain between the inventor and the public,
and the specificity of the field at issue does not remove certain members of the
public from being effective counterparties in the bargain. For instance, not all
members of the public are in the business of drilling oil. But anyone who
purchases gasoline, or tires, or any of the multitude of existing petroleum
products is affected (however marginally) by the issuance of a patent for some
new drilling technology. Even those few, if any, who do not purchase these
products are affected due to petroleum's function as a central cog in the global
141 King, supra note 8, at 770 (citing Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures and the H. Comm. on Ways and
means, 109th Cong. (2006)).
142 Id. at 770 n.67.
143 Id. at 770-71.
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economy. Long term, it is assumed that the technology underlying the patent
will reduce the costs of production, thereby lowering the ultimate cost to the
consumer. However, depending on exactly how the monopoly right is used,
costs could actually rise in the short term. The public at large has an interest in
the issuance of any patent, and a balancing test must be applied at all times.
That balance is not served by preemptively blocking off whole fields of
potential endeavor without the requisite showing of particular utility created by
an invention.
Perhaps the argument is limited to an understanding that the costs
associated with monopoly rights in the tax strategy context are potentially
direct, as opposed to the diffused costs discussed above. So even though not all
citizens drill oil, all (or at least an overwhelming amount) of citizens do pay
taxes. But while this is true, it is still not the case that an overwhelming amount
of citizens pay taxes in a manner likely to be precluded by patents. The
standard elements necessary to receive a patent prevent any method commonly
used to pay taxes from being restricted from free public use. The strategies
covered by patents issued thus far are complex and highly-specific, and do not
amount to a "method" of filling out a 1040-EZ with a freshly sharpened pencil.
The average user of these types of strategies is not the average taxpayer. These
strategies require a starting point of not insignificant resources, both to secure
the efforts of experts qualified to construct the strategy and, perhaps even more
so, to be positioned so as to benefit from the strategy.
Ultimately, though, the inability to indict tax strategy patents as affecting the
entire population in ways fundamentally different from the impact of any other
patent class is not grounds for refusing to examine their actual impact on
individual members of the public. A broad swath of people need not be
disenfranchised in order to declare that disenfranchisement illegal or
undesirable. And so it is still necessary to examine the exceptional effects of
legal method patents on the individual.
2. The Unique Depth of Legal Method Patents. In addressing King's concern of
whether it is "preferable" to allow tax method patents, it is imperative to
examine the reasoning underlying his conclusion, namely the court's argument
in Veeck. While Veeck dealt with "access" to the laws, King asserts that this
guaranteed access "is utterly meaningless without the concomitant right of an
individual to follow those laws." 1" This makes sense intuitively and follows
logically from the holding in Veeck. However, one need not find fault with the
linkage of this complementary right in order to recognize that there may be a
meaningful difference between the ability to comply with a law and the right to
144 Id. at 775.
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comply with the law in all conceivable fashions. The issuance of a tax strategy
patent does not prohibit compliance with the tax code; rather, it forecloses what
is by definition a very narrow, specific, and perhaps even arcane method of
compliance. "[I]n almost all cases, a patent holder will only control one means
of law compliance, not all means of law compliance." 45
Imagine, for example, an imaginary law requiring automobiles to be able to
travel fifty miles for every gallon of gasoline consumed. 146 A patent claiming all
automobiles that achieve such a MPG standard would prevent competitors
from complying with the law. It is inconceivable that such a patent would be
issued, however, as it would not only be obvious, but also taught by the prior
art. However, the development of a new, more efficient engine configuration
or a novel aerodynamic body design would most certainly be allowable. Such
methods of "complying" with the law are often patented. Likewise, compliance
with the sum requirements of tax law is not in any danger of being "owned" by
a savvy patentee. Instead specific avenues of compliance, similar to specific
automotive developments, would be discovered and patented.
King very briefly anticipates a similar argument. Presumably drawing from
language in Veeck that public access to the law cannot "be limited to a minimum
availability," King holds that "the availability of the most obvious and
unpatentable manners of compliance with the laws is not enough to guarantee
the type of due process envisaged by Veeck .. ."147 However, the very narrow
question at issue in Veeck, the rightful ownership of the content of a statute,
does not lend itself well to such a broad conception of "compliance" as used by
King. This is especially true when, as just discussed, particular methods of
complying with laws are regularly and unobjectionably patented.
King's contention that, since the government is without power to require
taxes above and beyond the minimum mandated by law, it is thus without
power to allow private parties to achieve a similar result also falls flat. Primarily,
there is a definite difference between the powers the government possesses and
those that it is able to distribute. This distinction can be readily seen in the
(unlikely) case of bounty hunters. "[B]ounty hunters are not usually considered
state actors . . . . This result is troublesome because it allows bounty hunters to
exercise broader powers of search and arrest than police officers . . . . [Tihey
145 Gruner, supra note 4, at 65.
146 King specifically denies the universal applicability of a parallel between patents for
complying with environmental regulations and those for complying with the tax code. However,
his argument in this regard rests on the allegedly unique nature of tax law, an issue dealt with in
Part III.A.2 of this Note.
147 King, supra note 8, at 775 (quoting Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International,
Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 2002)).
27
Stone: Legal Method Patents and the Rights of the Public
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2011
J. INTELL PROP. L
are not constrained by the constitutional and regulatory safeguards that law
enforcement officers must adhere to."1 48
The end result of bounty hunting, the capture of a fugitive, is certainly just
as much an effective equivalent of a standard arrest as is the paying of license
fees in lieu of freely practicing a tax strategy. In fact, it is likely even more of an
equivalent as the former case actually achieves the government's objective,
whereas licensing fees fail to generate governmental revenue, the purpose of
taxes. Admittedly, the law covering bounty hunters is far afield from the issues
in play here. However, the comparison bears making because of the magnitude
of the "expansion" in governmental powers allowed in that case. If the
government has the power to authorize private parties to skirt imperatives
derived from no less an authority than the Constitution (namely, among others,
the Fourth Amendment), surely we must not dismiss out of hand the
government's "ability to empower patent holders to collect what is effectively
additional tax revenue in the form of licensing fees."149
3. Polig Considerations for Allowing Legal Method Patents. Even if legal method
patents are not found to be congenitally illegitimate in the eyes of the law, it is
still useful to examine the policy implications of allowing their issuance. After
all, even if there is no reason to declare legal method patents invalid under the
current law, suitable reasons may exist for curtailing their propagation or effect.
Much as in the myriad other arguments arrayed against their promulgation, the
essence of determining their desirability is in determining the actual differences
between legal method patents and more traditional varieties thereof.
Some basis exists for believing there are separate policy concerns relating to
the practice of law as compared to all other concerns. Consider, for example,
the case of Dwyer v. Jung.150 In Duyer, a non-compete agreement was held
unenforceable against a partner departing a law firm. While restrictive
covenants are generally acceptable, the case holds that "[s]trong public policy
considerations preclude their applicability" in the case of lawyers.15  This
approach is generally followed, though restrictive covenants may still apply to
other professionals, such as doctors.152 And so, the question is whether access
to particular legal maneuvers are such an important concept (as is, apparently,
148 Adam M. Royval, Survey, United States v. Poe: A Missed Opportunity to Reevaluate Bounty
Hunters' Symbiotic Role in the CiminalJustice System, 87 DENV. U. L. REv. 789 (2010).
149 King, supra note 8, at 776.
150 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
1s1 Id. at 500.
152 See Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) (holding a restrictive covenant against
an oral surgeon was valid).
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access to legal counsel of one's choice) that any restriction thereto runs counter
to public policy.
The answer, at least so far as this Note is concerned, is no. Especially with
regard to the tax code, there is no immediately obvious reason why public rights
to legal methods deserve special protection not afforded to other areas of
intellectual property. Our patent system is expansive, and its reach into a field
such as life-saving pharmaceuticals presents a much more compelling case for
restrictions on its scope. Consider the prostate cancer drug Provenge, a full
course of treatment of which costs $93,000.153 It is possible that licensing the
rights to use a particular tax strategy could cost more in absolute terms as the
amount to be saved is potentially very large. However, it is important to
consider the expense of tax strategy patent licensing (however large) relative to
the cost of enforcing exclusionary rights. Denial of access (which is the
effective result of prohibitive costs) to Provenge, Avastin, Soliris, and other
extremely expensive drugs could result in death.154 Even outside the narrow
context of saving millionaires a few dollars on their taxes, even in the extreme
case of restricting a criminal defendant's rights to certain defense techniques, it
is unclear what interests potentially at issue would be more crucial to the self
than free access to a life-saving drug.
Of course, one could make very similar arguments with regard to the
distinction presented by Dnyer and Karpinski, two cases which, read as
analogues, reach a conclusion opposite to the one presented here.155 The law of
restrictive covenants sees fit to differentiate between the law and all other
human pursuits. Why, then, should the field of intellectual property reach a
different result?
The reason for reaching a different conclusion is presented above, namely,
that our patent system restricts rights to interests more fundamental to the
concept of the self than those at issue in the case of legal methods.
Furthermore, it does this for valid reasons. This is likely true even beyond the
best-case scenario (for this Note) wherein the legal methods at issue are
effectively represented by tax strategies. In accepting this rationale as sufficient
153 Ron Winslow, For Dendreon, It's 500 Prescripions for Provenge and Countin, WALL ST. J. HEALTH
BLOG (Aug. 3, 2010, 9:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/08/03/for-dendreon-its-500-
prescriptions-for-provenge-and-counting/.
154 Matthew Herper, The World's Most Expensive Drugs, FoRBES, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.for
bes.com/2010/02/19/expensive-drugs-cost-business-healthcare-rare-diseases.html. (Soliris costs
$409,500 a year; Avastin costs $50,000 a year.)
155 Karpinski in fact concerned an oral surgeon, but according to the logic of the case it could
just as well have been an oncologist. The difference in outcomes between Dnyer and Karpinski
results solely from a sense of the singular role that lawyers play in society.
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on its own, it is simply enough to say that the application of the rule with
respect to restrictive covenants should not be transported to intellectual
property. However settled, or even advantageous, the law may be in the former
field, it is not necessarily the case that it should therefore be freely transferred
to other areas of the law, especially when sound reasons exist for denying the
applicability of the law in other fields.
There are still other important distinctions between legal method patents
and pharmaceutical drug patents, however. This Note briefly contends that
legal method patents (tax strategy patents specifically) may satisfy the
incentivization rationale underlying our intellectual property regime. But the
conclusion reached comes short of a claim that the rationale applies equally
strongly to all conceptions of intellectual property. As previously mentioned,
not insubstantial resources may be expended in developing novel and beneficial
tax strategies, but, these outlays are still likely to pale in comparison to those
necessary to develop effective drugs.15 6 As an example, "[i]t costs around $1.75
billion to develop the average cancer medicine." 57 Thus, it could be argued
that the practice of restricting access to needed drugs, though facially even more
repellent than restricting access to legal methods, is a necessary evil accepted to
serve the greater public good of providing an incentive to produce these drugs
in the first place.
This Note accepts that such an argument is correct, insofar as it goes.
However, just because one tenet of intellectual property rationalization exists
more strongly for one subset of its domain than another is no reason to deny
the application of the rationale in the category vindicated less thoroughly.
Inasmuch as there is any incentivization provided by the granting of
exclusionary rights at all, it is necessary to weigh the relative costs and benefits
of granting these rights in order to adjudge their desirability from a public
policy perspective. As noted above, the exact type of legal method patented is
likely to have a substantial impact on the patent's legality and desirability.
Arguing from the extreme case of a criminal defendant in a capital trial, even if
one accepts the proposition that denying cancer patients uninhibited access to
pharmaceuticals is more abhorrent than restricting the defendant's rights to
certain defensive techniques, it is still a valid contention that incentivization
provides a better justification in the context of drug development. However,
this argument is unlikely to be equally effective with regards to the entire
continuum of imaginable legal method patents.
156 See supra Part II.E.3.
157 Brian Palmer, The $8,000 Pill, SLATE, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2264116/.
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Looking at the opposite extreme of tax strategy patents (which, not
unimportantly, represent the entirety of legal method patents at the present), a
different calculus is in order. While incentivization principles may still weigh
more heavily in favor of drug development, the difference between the costs to
those excluded (namely, increasing the taxable income of the wealthy compared
to denying a sick person drugs needed to live) is enormous. Therefore, it would
be improper to say that legal method patents, as a rule, are fundamentally
conceptually distinct from pharmaceutical patents with regard to their
justification from an incentivization standpoint.
4. Whither "Rghts"? Even if one were to accept Dayer as a proper model for
structuring unfettered access to all possible methods of legal compliance, there
is an important difference between the rights upheld in that case and those at
issue here. The core of Dnyer is expressed in the proposition that "[a] client is
always entitled to be represented by counsel of his own choosing." 58 However,
this entitlement is not equivalent to an absolute right to the representation.
Dnyer paraphrases Abraham Lincoln's "sage observation" that "[a] lawyer's
time and advice are his stock in trade." 5 9 Likewise, the "stock" of a patentee,
at least in the narrow sense of his exclusionary rights, is the patent itself. The
principle of Duyer is not to require all lawyers to provide their goods and
services to whosoever may ask. Rather, it only requires that members of the
public not be legally precluded from negotiating in their own best interest for
access to those goods and services. The nature of our patent law provides
exactly this possibility of access. The public is free to negotiate with the
patentee to receive a license for his invention's use. The fact that a license may
be cost-prohibitive is not particularly availing: access to the brightest legal
minds is likely to be attended by its own spectacular cost.
In that sense, monopoly rights of a certain sort (that is, so to speak, a
monopoly on talent) have always existed in the legal field, much the same as in
any other field of human endeavor. Our legal system is constructed to ensure
all its participants have access to suitably competent counsel, but it is
uncontroversial to say that material differences in ability often exist between
attorneys. Whether or not we choose to allow patents on tax strategies or
corporate structures or courtroom tactics, the public's access to certain
techniques will necessarily be limited by the quality of their counsel. The
requirements of patentability ensure that any developments in the legal field are
158 Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975). In the case's sole
footnote, the court makes a potential exception in the case of indigency. Id. at n.1. The existence
of such an exception is no impediment to this Note's argument.
159 Id. at 499.
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quite likely to be peculiarly insightful, and only discoverable by those at the top
of their field. Accordingly, access to the legal methods capable of being
patented is already limited to the privileged few represented by the top tier of
legal counsel. The accomplishment of our patent system is that it encourages
those who are most capable-those making advances in their chosen art-to
bring their inventions forth, so that the public, at least in the future, may share
in their utility. Thus, rather than reducing the ability of the public at large to
have full dominion over all means of legal compliance, legal method patents
may effect the very purpose of patents broadly: a distribution, over time, of the
benefits of progress.
There is no reason to believe that the inherently distinctive nature of legal
method patents prevents them from being suitable subject matter from a public
policy standpoint. Our intellectual property regime protects interests that are at
least as crucial to the maintenance of the self as the full command of the tax
code. Furthermore, the purposes of the patent system, namely the
incentivization to discover and the dedication of the benefit to the public, may
certainly be served by the inclusion of legal methods in its domain. But even if
it is accepted that their usefulness warrants their existence, it is still possible
some measures might be necessary in order to temper their effect.
5. A More limited Approach to Regulating Legal Method Patents. Though
expressing grave concerns over the effects of tax strategy patents, Aprill
recognizes the potential difficulty of unringing the bell, and discusses the
possibility of "limit[ing] liability for infringing or inducing infringement of such
patents." 60  A handful of approaches to this effect have already been
attempted.161 The rather unique case of medical patents has prompted some
successful legislation to achieve a similar result. In 1996, Congress limited
liability "[w]ith respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement."162 Under the law, "the patentee has
no remedy, and no injunction, no damages and no attorney fees are available
against a medical practitioner who performs [a patented] medical activity."' 63
The arguments marshaled in favor of the law were very similar to those arrayed
against the promulgation of legal method patents: restricted access to
procedures and a concomitant compromise of patient care, increased financial
burdens, and the lack of a need for incentivization in the field.164 Lee contends
160 Aprill, supra note 7, at 26.
161 See supra Part I.c.
162 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2010).
163 Eric M. Lee, 35 U.S.C J 287(C--The Physiian Immunity Statute, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 701, 708 (1997).
164 Id. at 710.
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that "these concerns could have been addressed by strict application of the
current laws and administratively rather than through ... legislation." 6 5 That
claim is certainly consistent with the approach taken by this Note, but even if
one were to believe that the legislation was necessary in the case of medical
processes, it is still not clear that a similar restriction is necessary or advisable as
regards legal methods.
In response to the "main thrust of the medical community's opposition to
medical procedure patents," there is not obviously the same "tradition of free
and open exchange of information" in the field of legal methods.' 66 Opponents
of legal method patents foretell a chilling effect of sorts on the free exchange of
innovative techniques. Although, especially with respect to tax strategies, it is
unclear to what golden age of free information exchange opponents refer. As
Gruner points out, "[a] number of innovators in tax reduction methods have
made these methods available to clients only under trade secret restrictions that
have limited public dissemination and discussion of these methods." 67
Furthermore, the burden of compliance, both in theory and practice would
likely be smaller in the case of legal practitioners. Although it would be unfair
and inefficient to saddle all attorneys with the responsibility of becoming
experts in intellectual property law, it is still true that they are better positioned
to do so than doctors. This advantage likely carries over even in the case of
accountants, who could presumably comprise a sizable proportion of tax
strategy patentees. The purview of tax specialists-the assimilation and
manipulation of various aspects of tax law-lends itself more to an
understanding of patent restrictions than does that of doctors, whose area of
expertise lies in the life sciences.
Furthermore, opponents of legal method patents express concern over the
possible burden of "due diligence research on the existence of patents."'6
Although it is unclear why this restriction would singularly injure legal
practitioners compared to other professionals, the real-world consequences of
such a requirement would appear more dire in the case of a doctor at the
operating table, unsure of whether he was about to transgress intellectual
property rights. And so even if one accepts the expediency of Section 287(c), it
does not follow that such a policy should be applied to legal method patents. It
is unclear what benefits, if any, would accrue to limiting the vigor of
enforcement of legal method patents as distinct from other patent varieties.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Gruner, supra note 4, at 75.
168 Beale, supra note 6, at 108.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Legal method patents do present unique challenges and likely do represent a
conceptually distinct classification within patent jurisprudence. However, even
as a separate category, these patents can fulfill the roles contemplated by our
intellectual property regime. To be sure, in the context of granting exclusionary
rights over methods of legal compliance there are important differences
between the different conceivable types of legal method patents. Generally,
however, the arguments commonly applied against legal method patents are
equally applicable (with, perhaps, varying degrees of force) to the lot.
Legal method patents are claimed to be outside the purview of the patent
system because they do not qualify as inventions. It is argued that monopolies
over legal methods are not necessary to properly incentivize their development.
Tax strategy patents, specifically, are alleged to be inconsistent with the purpose
of the tax system. There is at least some reason to doubt that these arguments,
even taken together, are dispositive of the validity or desirability of legal method
patents. In essence, many of these arguments implicate another, potentially
more alarming, supposed fault with the patents' existence: the distinctive nature
of the legal system calls for a wholly separate analysis in determining the
legitimacy of granting dominion over particular applications of its machinery.
The breadth of the legal system, that is, its capacity to affect vast
proportions of the populace, is one potential reason to more closely examine
the desirability of legal method patents. However, as the nature of the patent
system is essentially a bargain between the inventor and the government qua the
public, this is true for all patentable subject matters. Even considering that tax
strategy ownership may effect a more direct cost on the citizenry (as such a
large percentage thereof are actual taxpayers), it remains the case that the
narrow applicability of patentable developments means very few individuals will
be precluded from partaking in their benefit.
The other aspect of legal method patents that potentially distinguishes them
from other patentable subject matters is the natural rights and legal guarantees
concerning an individual's access to the law. Even if one considers legal
method patents as granting exclusive rights over compliance with the law (as
opposed to say, a particular method of structuring investments that merely
reaps the benefits of our tax law), there is an important distinction between an
individual's fundamental right to be able to comply with the law and a supposed
right to comply with the law in all conceivable fashions.
Beyond a legal right to full, unimpeded access to the rights cordoned off by
legal method patents, there may still be concerns over whether the expansion of
patentable subject matter in the field remains a good idea. However, this Note
[Vol. 18:595628
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discerns no valid reason why legal method patents should be subject to any
specific strictures. It is true that the law (and at the very least its practice) has
been seen sufficiently singular so as to warrant a different approach in
regulating its use in some contexts. This difference has not yet been so firmly
established in intellectual property jurisprudence though, and there is no
compelling reason to do so.
Intellectual property rights over life-saving technology (though often
maligned) are a firmly established principle. Compared to this standard, any
pretense to a legal technique (especially in the case of, say, a particular method
of reducing tax liability) is likely to be less indispensable to those making a claim
thereto. The greater need for generating positive externalities in the
development of pharmaceuticals is offset by the lesser cost of denying the
public uninhibited access to a hypothetical patented legal method (especially,
once again, in the narrow context of tax strategies). In any case, there is a
natural, even inexorable, gradation in the access of the public to the full
privilege of the law. Allowing legal methods to be patented will allow novel and
beneficial developments in the field to be more freely enjoyed by the public at
large. Even a more limited restriction of the scope of legal method patents is
unnecessary. The immunity that doctors receive from infringing medical
processes is less warranted and less necessary to insulate infringers of legal
methods.
More thought needs to be devoted to the degree certain theoretical
manifestations of legal method patents may infringe upon the rights of the
public. As a category unto themselves, however, legal method patents are a
natural and possibly beneficial outgrowth of the patent system.
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